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HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN
NEW YORK CITY-ANOTHER LOOK AT AN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ALBERTA. WALSH*
Like most early housing codes, the 1967 New York City Housing
Maintenance Code was enforceable by criminal, not civil proceedings.
An earlier version, which had included civil remedies and procedures as
an alternative to criminal prosecution, was rejected by the City Council
because it could not agree on parallel utilization of the existing civil and
criminal court structures; creation of a new, consolidated housing court,
with both civil and criminal jurisdiction; or creation of an administrative
tribunal, with the power to impose civil penalties and grant other forms
of relief, within the enforcement agency.
It soon became apparent that this critical decision could not be
delayed. Housing code enforcement through criminal proceedings was
an inefficient and ineffective process, a condition not peculiar to New
York City but existent generally in municipalities throughout the nation.I
For example in 1968, 31,425 code violation cases (out of a backlog of
some 150,000 cases) were tried in the New York City criminal courts.
After an average delay of more than seventeen months, these cases
resulted in an average fine of only $11.47-demonstrably less than the
average cost of removing the violations. Not only were these cases
overloading the criminal court system, but the deterrent effect of such
minimal, long-delayed punishment was negligible if not actually counter-
productive. Although the penal law authorized prison sentences for
* Chairman, Housing and Urban Development Committee, The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York.
1. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965).
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serious code violations, this harsh sanction was almost never imposed.
Most criminal court judges felt that housing code violators were not true
criminals and should not be prosecuted in the criminal courts. Many
observers believed that the criminal nature of the proceeding actually
hindered effective code enforcement by permitting dilatory tactics and
trial delays typical of a criminal proceeding. Lengthy prosecutions con-
siderably delayed correction of code violations.
After the consolidation of five city housing agencies into a single
"super-agency," the Housing and Development Administration (HDA)
and Mayor John V. Lindsay presented the New York State Legislature
with a proposed bill. This proposal was designed to establish a compre-
hensive code enforcement program which would include the discovery of
violations as well as the imposition of sanctions. The bill would authorize
administrative as well as judicial proceedings to impose penalties, would
provide for the establishment of a penalty schedule based on the nature
and severity of the violation and the nature of the work necessary to cor-
rect it. The proposed bill also would grant the city power to enforce such
administrative penalties as court judgments while providing for both ad-
ministrative appeal and judicial review of all such determinations. In one
of its potentially most effective provisions, the bill also would provide
for the collection of landlord penalties directly from the rents of the
building rather than by collection of a money judgment through supple-
mentary proceedings.
Under the bill, HDA would have been authorized to serve either a
"notice of finding of violation" or an "order to certify correction of vio-
lation." The former would have provided an immediate penalty accord-
ing to the established schedule (up to a maximum of $100 for a single vio-
lation and $250 for multiple violations on a single building). The latter
would have required specific corrective action and the filing of a certifi-
cation of completion of such action within a specified period of time;
failure to certify, or to provide a satisfactory reason for not certifying,
would subject the responsible party to a separate schedule of penalties
(up to a maximum of $500). Although a civil penalty and criminal prose-
cution against the same person could not be based upon the same "find-
ing of violation" or "order to certify correction," the continued exist-
ence of the same unlawful condition could provide a basis for criminal
action.
By switching the emphasis from punishment to the correction of viola-
tions and by coordinating code enforcement with other programs and
resources available within HDA (e.g., emergency repairs, problem build-
ing evaluation and treatment, rent restructuring, rehabilitation loans, tax
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exemption), the Lindsay legislation represented a noteworthy attempt to
integrate code enforcement as a primary ingredient in an overall, com-
prehensive effort to upgrade and maintain the quality of New York
City's housing. Unfortunately, legislative suspicion, intense lobbying
against the bill by tenant and landlord groups (both of which seemed to
feel that the administrative agency would be biased in favor of the other),
as well as opposition by large segments of the bar and the judiciary, led
to the rejection of the Lindsay proposal and propelled the creation of the
present housing court.2 Significantly, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York supported the concept of an administrative procedure,
but not the Lindsay bill. In 1971 it offered its own version of an adminis-
trative tribunal, which differed from the Lindsay bill in that the adminis-
trative review board, called the "Housing Maintenance Appeals Board,"
would be located outside of HDA. This approach was not seriously con-
sidered by the Legislature.
The 1972 Act did not create a separate, independent tribunal but
rather grafted a housing part, with new, flexible powers of code enforce-
ment and civil sanctions, onto the existing civil court structure. The Act
decriminalized code enforcement (except in extreme cases), established a
graduated civil penalty system; and consolidated into a single court all
criminal and civil proceedings involving code violations and other land-
lord-tenant disputes. Initially, the court did not have full equity powers.
However, the Act was amended in 1977 to give its hearing officers the
power to "hear, determine and grant any relief within the powers of the
housing part in any action or proceeding." 3 This power included the
power to issue injunctions and restraining orders, to establish receiver-
ships, and to punish for contempt. The 1977 amendment also expanded
the jurisdiction of the court to include all residential codes enforced by
municipal agencies. Thus, the court now has the authority to hear not
only proceedings for violations of the housing maintenance code but also
violations of the city's fire and health codes and portions of the building
code.
By granting plenary jurisdiction over all housing related matters to a
single court and combining non-monetary remedies with damages and
civil penalties, the goal of the 1972 Act and its 1977 amendments was to
drastically improve the condition of existing housing. The legislation in-
tended to create a single forum where all parties, landlord, tenant and the
city, could resolve all problems involving a particular building in a single,
2. N.Y. C% CT ACT § 110 (McKinney 1978), enacted by 1972 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 982.
3. 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 849, amending N.Y. CIv. CT. ACT § 110 (McKinney 1978).
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consolidated proceeding. As the Chief Administrative Judge of the civil
court stated, "Rehabilitation was to be the new order of the day."
4
While the creation of a single-purpose forum clearly improves upon
the prior system and results in a more equitable resolution of individual
housing disputes, the court has almost totally failed to achieve its prima-
ry objective of reducing code violations. As Civil Court Judge Leonard
N. Cohen said, "the primary function of the new court is the same as the
old; rent collection and eviction or court deposits of rent pending final
judgments-code enforcement is a secondary consideration.'" For ex-
ample, in 1977 there were 425,196 petitions filed in the housing court;
418,236 of which were summary proceedings for non-payment of rent. In
fact, even New York City landlord and tenant groups agree that the
housing court has not fulfilled its mandate. "Unfortunately, the housing
court has been neither an efficient mechanism for the swift collection of
rents nor an effective deterrent to housing deterioration." 6
In a management audit released on February 3, 1979, City Comptrol-
ler Harrison J. Goldin said that the housing court was continuing to fight
the city's housing problem "in a manner analogous to trying to fill thou-
sands of potholes with eyedroppers... We have found that it views itself
as a traditional judicial forum with narrow responsibility and authority,
[and] as a result, conditions in a single apartment are argued in court,
while scores of violations in the same building are ignored."
7
Other major assertions of the comptroller's study include:
1. The city does not use the housing court to recover money spent
on emergency repairs, for which landlords are billed for work
done by contractors hired by the city, or to collect past-due prop-
erty taxes.8 Mr. Goldin said that $34.7 million a year was owed
the city from these two sources and that nearly one-fourth of the
landlords who went into housing court to sue tenants owed
money to the city for emergency repairs.
4. E. THOMPSON, CIVIL JUSTICE IN A DYNAMIC CITY (1974).
5. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT LAW, URBAN HOUSING
COURTSAND LANDLORD-TENANT JUSTICE: NATIONAL MODELS AND EXPERIENCE (1977).
6. Gallet & Littlefield, New York City Housing Court: Revisited, 9 VERITAS (1978). See
also Goodman, Housing Court: The New York Tenant Experience, 17 URBAN L. ANN. 57
(1979).
7. OFFICE OF THE CITY COMPTROLLER, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT: MANAGEMENT
AUDIT (1979).
8. Unfortunately, the housing court does not presently have jurisdiction over the collec-
tion of property taxes.
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2. Landlords violating the city's housing code are rarely penalized
by the court, undermining its potential to deter owners who in-
tentionally allow their buildings to deteriorate.
3. Conditions in the court are "confused and crowded," with law-
yers and litigants forced into noisy corridors to try to settle their
disputes.
4. Cases often do not get into housing court for several years, forc-
ing tenants to put up with harsh conditions during the interim.9
Perhaps now, after six years' experience with the housing court, it is
time to stop viewing the problem from the ambitious expectations of
1972 and look afresh at the administrative approach proposed by Mayor
Lindsay in 1970, especially given the degree of housing deterioration and
abandonment faced by New York City in 1979. I am not suggesting abo-
lition of the housing court, but rather utilizing the court for what it is-a
specialized judicial tribunal admirably suited for the resolution of com-
plicated housing disputes. The court is not an efficient mechanism for
the processing of thousands of routine code violation cases, nor is it the
"one-stop" building treatment center envisioned by its original advo-
cates. However, I am suggesting the obvious and time-tested middle
ground: an administrative procedure (similar to the present rent control
hearing procedure) within the agency for handling the vast majority of
code enforcement cases, and judicial review of administrative determina-
tions and other proceedings, e.g., summary proceedings, receivership,
injunction, criminal prosecutions, in the housing court. This would re-
quire amendment of Chapter 26 of the Administrative Code of the City
of New York to authorize the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, to conduct hearings and impose civil penalties for code en-
forcement violations, as well as amendment of the New York Civil Prac-
tice Act and Rules to provide for judicial review of HPD administrative
determinations by the housing court and not by the supreme court of the
state.
Admittedly, this is a two-step procedure; not the one-stop miracle that
we have been seeking for the past ten years. But perhaps it's time to ad-
mit that miracles don't happen - at least not in New York City landlord-
tenant relations - and an apparently complicated two-step approach
may actually be simpler and more workable than the much vaunted com-
prehensive, consolidated housing court.
This is not to say that another change in just one element of the com-
9. Id.
1979)
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plex housing machinery - code enforcement - will significantly abate
the problem of housing deterioration in New York City, or that it will
solve all of the endemic problems of the housing court, but it should re-
sult in a number of distinct improvements:
1. to the extent that cases can be finally disposed of at the administra-
tive level, it should reduce the present congestion and confusion in the
housing court;
2. it should stimulate HPD to "try harder" and to improve coordina-
tion and cooperation between code enforcement staff and agency hearing
officers;
3. it should increase the utilization and efficiency of HPD's computer
system to diagnose problem buildings and identify necessary corrective
action; and
4. it should enable, and even encourage, the HPD hearing officer to
consider each case in the light of all of the programs and resources
available to him.
Administrative determination of code violation cases within HPD
would be particularly helpful in the many thousands of cases which in-
volve both rent control and code enforcement issues. Since rent control
disputes are presently decided (subject to judicial review) by an ad-
ministrative procedure within HPD, the related issues could be decided
in a single proceeding by a hearing officer who also had the power to
order emergency repairs or make rehabilitation financing and/or tax
abatement available for the building.
If the primary goal of code enforcement is the correction of hazardous
or unhealthy building conditions, then perhaps it's time we learn from
our experience and combine the best features of the housing court with
the advantages to be gained from an administrative procedure. The least
we should strive for is the fair and expeditious resolution of housing con-
flicts by coordination of the housing court with the city's other housing
programs and resources.
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